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COMMENT
Amendment by Convention: Our Next Constitutional Crisis?
On September 15, 1787, in the waning moments of the Philadel-
phia Convention, which drafted the United States Constitution, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina observed that "conventions are
serious things and ought not to be repeated."1 Americans have appar-
ently taken Pinckney's wisdom to heart, for in our long history as a
constitutional republic, there has never been another federal constitu-
tional convention. This is true although the Constitution expressly au-
thorizes "a Convention for proposing Amendments,"'2 and despite the
fact that in the years since the Constitution was ratified approximately
two hundred sixty-nine resolutions have been submitted to Congress
by the States calling for national constitutional conventions. 3
Article V is the part of the Constitution that provides for its own
amendment. It reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which,
in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as a part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress: Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior
to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in -the Ninth Section of
the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be de-
prived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Under article V there are two means of proposing constitutional
amendments: either by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress,
1. 2 M. FAR-AND, Tns RrcoRDs oF THE FrDEAL CoNVENTioN oF 1787, at 632
(1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
2. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
3. State Applications Calling for a Constitutional Convention to Propose Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States: 1787 to July 1, 1974 (unofficial list
prepared by the staff of the United States Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
as revised, September 25, 1974) [hereinafter cited as State Applications].
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or by a constitutional convention called by Congress in response to peti-
ions of two-thirds of the state legislatures. The powers of Congress
or of the constitutional convention are limited to proposing amend-
ments. Proposed amendments become part of the Constitution only
when ratified by three-fourths of the States. Congress, regardless of
how the amendments are proposed, has the exclusive power to deter-
mine the method of ratification4 and must choose to have the proposed
amendments ratified either by the state legislatures or by conventions
held in each state for that purpose. Each of the present twenty-six
amendments to the Constitution were initially proposed by the Con-
gress. Since the national convention procedure has never been used,
it remains a constitutional curiosity. As is clear from the language of
article V, the convention would be a truly national forum with the au-
thority to propose important changes in our system of government.
But beyond this literal reading, article V is tantalizingly vague.
American constitutional law and history have developed within the
long shadow cast by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, and students
and practitioners of our national political system have generally shared
Gladstone's opinion of the Constitution as "the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." It
is, then, understandable that constitutional scholars from James Madi-
son5 to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.6 have approached the subject of a
new constitutional convention with a prudent degree of apprehension
bred by proper respect for the enduring vitality of the Constitution.
Much of the fear of a constitutional convention, which might, for
example, seek to undermine important rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, springs undoubtedly from the language of article
4. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931).
5. [An article V national convention] would consequently give greater agita-
tion to the public mind; an election into it would be courted by the most vio-
lent partisans on both sides; it wd probably consist of the most heterogenous
characters; would be the very focus of that flame which has already too much
heated men of all parties; would no doubt contain individuals of insidious
views, who under the mask of seeking alterations popular in some parts but
inadmissible in other parts of the Union might have a dangerous opportunity
of sapping the very foundations of the fabric. Under all these circumstances
it seems scarcely to be presumable that the deliberation of the body could be
conducted in harmony, or terminate in the general good. Having witnessed the
difficulties and dangers experienced by the first Convention which assembled
under every propitious circumstance, I should tremble for the result of a sec-
ond.
Letter of James Madison to G.L. Turberville, November 2, 1788, in 5 U.S. BUREAU OF
ROLLS AND LIBRARY, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870, at 104-05 (1905).




V itself, which leaves unanswered numerous questions concerning the
nature and scope of the powers of a national constitutional convention.
7
The heat of the controversy surrounding article V represents the
constitutional friction generated by the insertion of a new deliberative
body into a political system carefully balanced by the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers and limited by the principles of federalism.' Who
determines the validity of state applications? Where would the con-
vention be held and how long would it last? May Congress refuse to
call a convention, given a sufficient number of valid applications? Are
questions such as these justiciable in the courts, or are they "political
questions"9 to be left to other departments of government?
Since there has never been a constitutional convention under
article V, there exists no precedent to suggest solutions for these dif-
ficult problems. Likewise, there are no Supreme Court cases directly
on point, and precious few on the amendment process generally.10
Congress, though it has considered the problem on several different
occasions,' has passed no legislation on the subject. Fear and uncer-
tainty, in many cases justified, have left the convention procedure much
ignored and little understood. Yet so long as the words remain in the
Constitution, a national constitutional convention is a possibility.
Fundamental wisdom and common sense on so important a matter
would thus seem to require that the problems in the article V conven-
7. Concern over the wording of the national convention procedure is as old as
article V itself: "Mr. Madison remarked on the vagueness of the terms, 'call a Conven-
tion for the purpose,' as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article. How was a Con-
vention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?" 2 FARRAND,
supra note 1, at 558 (quoting Madison's notes).
8. Professor Orfield has suggested that an article V convention would be, in ef-
fect, a fourth branch of government, coequal with the Congress, the Executive and the
Judiciary. See L. ORFiELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47-48
(1942).
9. For a discussion of justiciability and the political question doctrine see text ac-
companying notes 130-34 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 137-67 infra.
11. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1272 Before the'Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 2307
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., STATE APPLICATIONS ASKING CONGRESS TO CALL A FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION (Comm. Print 1959); Hearings on Amending the Constitution
Relative to Taxes on Incomes, Inheritances, and Gifts Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on S.J. Res. 23
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954);
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SaSS., PROBLEMS RELATING
TO STATE APPLICATIONS FOR A CONVENTION TO PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON FEDERAL TAX RATES (Comm. Print 1952).
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tion process be anticipated and dealt with effectively. Given the
dearth of contemporary authority, investigation into the meaning and
requirements of article V, as with other parts of the Constitution, might
best begin with. the comments of the men who wrote it.12
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF ARTICLE V
Although today it might seem that an amendment clause should
be an indispensable part of any national charter, this view was by no
means common among eighteenth century political theorists. In fact,
just the opposite was true; the idea of making changes in a constitution
was foreign to European political systems. The power of amendment
was a unique product of the American experience, 13 arising out of the
conviction that ultimate sovereignty is in the people. This radical con-
ception of state sovereignty found power in the people not only to make
a constitution, but, as a necessary corollary, to amend and to revise it.'4
It was the impotence of the national government under the Articles
of Confederation,' 5 manifested in part by the unanimity requirement
for amendment, that led Congress in 1787 to call for a federal conven-
12. The Supreme Court has long recognized the propriety of drawing upon the de-
bates in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the essays of The Federalist and other
writings of the Founding Fathers as aids in construing vague and ambiguous constitu-
tional provisions. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Mis-
souri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895); Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1878); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
13. See, e.g., C. BRICKFIELD, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION I (Comm.
Print 1957); Scheips, The Significance and Adoption of Article V of the Constitution,
26 No'mr DAME LAW. 46, 48 (1950).
14. L. ORFIELO, supra note 8, at 1. For the first time in the history of written
constitutions, an amending provision appeared in the Pennsylvania Frame of Govern-
ment drawn up by William Penn and his colonists in 1683. By 1787 the constitutions
of eight states contained clauses dealing with amendment; five provided for amendment
by convention and three, by the legislature. W. Pullen, The Application Clause of the
Amending Provision of the Constitution 1 (1951) (unpublished thesis in Wilson Library,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). In states such as Virginia, whose consti-
tution did not permit amendment, the need for an amending clause was strongly felt.
During debate on article V, Madison lamented that "[t]he Virginia state government
was the first which was made, and though its defects are evident to every person, wo
cannot get it amended. The Dutch have made four several attempts to amend their sys-
tem without success. The few alterations made in it were by tumult and faction, and
for the worse." I FARRAND, supra note 1, at 476.
15. Article XIII provided (in part): "The Articles of this confederation shall be
inviolably observed by every state, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any altera-
tion at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration shall be agreed
to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures
of every state." DocuMENTs OF AMERICAN HISTORY 115 (8th ed. H. COMMAGER 1968).
Note, incidentally, that article XIII made no provision for a constitutional convention.
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tion "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Con-
federation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such
alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress,
and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate
to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union."'16
A. Prerequisite Conditions for Amending the Constitution
In the proceedings and debates of the 1787 Convention, some
general philosophical and political considerations emerged as to the in-
tent of the Framers regarding the amendment process generally and
the function of an article V convention specifically. Broadly speaking,
written into the language of article V as it appears today are three pre-
requisite conditions for amending the Constitution:
(1) "Perfection", and the Amendment Process
The Constitution proposed by the Philadelphia Convention was
intended to be the ultimate expression and statement of -the sovereignty
of the American people. Continued acceptance by the people of the
authority and legitimacy of the Constitution requires that amendments
be the product of an orderly, controlled and procedurally correct consti-
tutional process.' 7  Professor Bonfield summarizes -the argument in this
manner:
Because of the uniquely fundamental nature of a constitu-
tional amendment, attempts to alter our Constitution should not be
filled with highly questionable procedures which could reasonably
cast doubt on the ultimate validity of the provision produced. The
procedure followed in any effort to amend the Constitution should
be so perfect that it renders unequivocal to all reasonable men the
binding nature of the product.' 8
16. 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS Oiq THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrruTION 120 (2d ed. 1836).
17. The Constitution expressly provides that all amendments "shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis
added). As Professor Black has written, "a high degree of adherence to exact form,
at least in matters of importance, is desirable in this ultimate legitimating process; a con-
stitutional amendment ought to go through a process unequivocally binding on all."
Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J.
957, 963 (1963).
18. Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Some Prob-
lems, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 659, 661 (1964). The point was also made during debate
on article V at the Philadelphia Convention. Col. Mason argued that "[a]mendments
will therefore be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
and constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence." 1 FARmAND, supra note
1, at 202-03. James Iredell of North Carolina, later a United States Supreme Court Jus-
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(2) The Need for a National Consensus
A procedurally "perfect" amendment process should operate to
change the Constitution only when there exists a national consensus
for change. 19 Such a national consensus is virtually assured by the re-
quirement of article V that amendments be proposed only by a two-
thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, or by a convention called
at the request of two-thirds of the States. In addition, after the amend-
ments are proposed, they do not become part of the Constitution until
ratified by three-fourths of the States in the manner chosen by Con-
gress. Thus at every stage of the amendment process the consent of
supermajorities is required, under the presumption that it will be im-
possible to achieve such majorities without widespread national agree-
ment on the need for amendment.20
(3) Deliberation and Debate Before a National Forum
Given a procedurally correct amendment process and a national
consensus for change, the Framers further intended that amendment
proposals be brought before a national assembly of representatives of
the people. 21  As the United States Supreme Court noted in Hawke
tice, argued before the state convention considering ratification of the Constitution that
"it is a most happy circumstance, that there is a remedy in the system itself for its own
fallibility, so that alterations can without difficulty be made, agreeable to the general
sense of the people." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 16, at 176-77. Likewise Madison com-
mented in The Federalist:
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be fore-
seen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be
provided. The mode preferred by the Convention seems to be stamped with
every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility which
would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which
might perpetrate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the gen-
eral and the State governments to originate the amendments of errors, as they
may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other.
Tim FEDERALIST No. 43, at 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
19. Professor Dodd has written, "in bringing about a change in the federal Consti-
tution. . . two elements must unite: (a) the sentiment of the people in favor of change,
and particularly in favor of the specific change being urged; and (b) operation of the
machinery for the purpose of effecting such a change." Dodd, Amending the Federal
Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321, 354 (1921).
20. See,,e.g., Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). The provisions of article V
thus illustrate "the conviction of the Founding Fathers that the seriousness of this kind
of action demands a national consensus of the sort required to achieve such two-thirds
votes." Bonfield, supra note 18, at 661.
21. "On principle, it appears to me that the point is that no constifutonal cbanees
should go forward to ratification without having first undergone examination and debate
in a national forum, whether it be Congress or a convention." Hearings on S. 2307
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 62 (1968) (statement of A. Bickel).
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v. Smith,22 "This article IV] makes provision for the proposal of amend-
ments either by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or on applica-
tion of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States; thus securing delib-
eration and consideration before any change can be proposed." 2"5
Once the national forum, whether Congress or convention, is satisfied
with the proposal and has submitted it to the States for ratification,
article V insures yet further debate and discussion by requiring that
the amendment be ratified either by the State legislatures or State con-
ventions, "which it was assumed would voice the will of the people.
24
B. Proposing Amendments by Convention: An Alternative to
Congress
The above-mentioned conditions are satisfied under the pro-
cedure whereby Congress proposes amendments. Yet article V pro-
vides for an alternative process-proposing amendments by constitu-
tional convention. Since the congressional procedure works effec-
tively, is technically simple in its operation, and has built around it a
formidable body of constitutional-amendment law based upon prece-
dent and repetition, what distinguishable purpose is the convention pro-
cedure intended to serve?
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 were in
sharp disagreement as to how amendments ought to be brought about.
At the center of the dispute was the role of the Congress.25  Some
of the delegates were deeply suspicious of allowing the national govern-
ment to interfere in the amendment process. 26  Eventually a major
22. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
23. Id. at 226. "What is a convention? A constitutional convention . . .must
be a deliberative body, but beyond that it cannot be accurately described." Platz, Arti-
cle V of the Federal Constitution, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17, 45 (1934).
24. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226-27 (1920).
25. As Madison noted, "the exclusion of the National Legislature from the process
was at issue." 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 202. Some, like Col. Mason, believed that
the Congress should not be a part of the amending process. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note
16, at 182. Others, such as Gouverneur Morris, advocated a role for Congress. Id. at
498.
26. Resolution 13 of the Virginia Plan introduced by John Randolph provided that
"the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required" to amend the Consti-
tution. 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 22. Col. Mason defended this position, noting that
"[it would be improper to require the consent of the Nat'l Legislature, because they
may abuse their power and refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity
for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment." Id.
at 203.
Hamilton displayed somewhat greater confidence in the integrity of future Con-
gresses: "The mode proposed was not adequate. The State Legislatures will not apply
for alterations but with a view to increase their own powers-The National Legislature
1975] 497
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compromise was reached, albeit over Madison's misgivings.27  The
Convention drafted article V to require Congress to call a constitutional
convention for proposing amendments upon application of two-thirds
of the states.28  This procedure was to be a genuine alternative to the
procedure under which Congress proposes amendments.
As the debates make clear,20 the article V convention provision
was inserted to allow the people of the States to propose amendments
should the Congress be unwilling to do so. The compromise was moti-
vated by the fear of some that the Congress might someday abuse,
neglect, or exceed its constitutional powers and would then be most
unlikely to propose amendments on the issue of its own wrongdoing."
The convention procedure was conceived as yet another of the funda-
mental checks and balances written into our constitutional system.
There is nothing to suggest that the Framers intended the con-
gressional procedure to be the predominant amendment process. To
the contrary, they felt that they had struck a proper balance in dis-
tributing the power to propose anaendments, intending to express a
preference for neither method.3' The popular appeal of the alterna-
tive amendment process was frequently exploited as delegates pleaded
with their various state conventions to ratify the new Constitution. "
Hamilton defended article V by characterizing the alternative amend-
ment process as a safeguard against a reluctant or despotic Congress.
He felt that the process of collecting the required number of state ap-
will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments.
. -.. There could be no danger in giving [Congress] this power [to call a conven-
tion], as the people would finally decide in the case." 2 id. at 558.
As a result of this disagreement, the Committee of Style and Revision reported back
a revised draft of article V that made no provision for proposing amendments independ-
ent of the Congress. Id. at 602. In the margin of his copy of the revised draft, an
outraged Col. Mason scribbled his objection that "should [Congress] prove ever so op-
pressive, the whole people of America can't make, or even propose alterations to it; a
doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and liberties of
the people." Id. at 629 n.8.
27. Id. at 629-30.
28. Id.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. Id.
31. The Senate Judiciary Committee in 1973 concluded that "[tihere is no evi-
dence whatsoever that the Framers did not regard this means to be as desirable and as
viable as that which allows for constitutional amendment at the initiation of Congress."
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEDURES
AcT, S. REP. No. 293, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1973).
32. Madison felt that article V "equally enables the general and the State govern-
ments to originate the amendments of errors...." Thm FEDERALIST No. 43, at 315
(B. Wright ed. 1961).
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plications and calling the convention under article V manifested "one
of those Tare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the
test of mathematical demonstration." 33
C. Historical and Political Significance of Article V
Although a national convention has never been called, still the
alternative amendment procedure has played a significant role in the
American political process.3 4  The constitutional history of the United
States is replete with state applications calling for a convention,33 and
more than once the awesome spectre of an impending constitutional
convention has inspired an otherwise reluctant Congress to act. 6
For example, following the adjournment of the Philadelphia Con-
vention during the State ratification debates, anti-federalists in control
of legislatures in Virginia 37 and New York38 led the way in calling for
a new constitutional convention. Pressure from -these influential states
resulted, on September 25, 1789, in the proposal by Congress of twelve
amendments. 39  This made the second convention unnecessary, for ten
of the proposals, the present Bill of Rights, were ultimately ratified by
the States.40
Other significant national movements for a second convention
arose in the late 1820's and early 1830's during the nullification contro-
versy,4 and during the crisis period immediately preceding the out-
break of the Civil War.
41
The twentieth century brought a new period of article V activism
among the States. During this century Congress has been flooded with
33. Id. No. 85, at 546 (A. Hamilton).
34. For an excellent general treatment of the historical importance of article V's
alternative amendment procedure in national policy-making see W. Pullen, supra note
14.
35. See State Applications, supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 105-13.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 30.
40. U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X.
41. W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 33-67. The doctrine of Nullification, or State In-
terposition, held that the States, as sovereigns, retained the power to "veto" or "nullify"
acts of Congress when the state legislature determined that the congressional statute was,
in its sole opinion, unconstitutional. Calhoun and others were fierce advocates of the
doctrine, convinced that it was the only possible way the Union could be preserved short
of civil war. See generally J. BLuM, B. CATrON, E. MORGAN, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., K.
STAMPP, & C. WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL ExP CERIENc (2d ed. 1968).
42. W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 68-84.
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applications for a convention. 3 And as the number of applications has
increased sharply, the purpose of the States in submitting them has also
changed. States have seized upon the alternative amendment process
as a tactical device to catch the attention of Congress. 4"
This shift in purpose is perhaps best illustrated by the national
controversy in the early 1900s over direct election of United States
Senators.45  The States played upon the chronic fear of the American
people, Congressmen and Senators included, of another constitutional
convention, and in the end compelled Congress to propose the seven-
teenth amendment. 46  Some Senators who were opposed to direct elec-
tion preferred the submission of the amendment by Congress rather
than risk a convention. 47 Between 1893 and 1911, thirty-one applica-
tions were collected, 48 and under intense pressure to call the conven-
tion, the Congress in 1912 chose to avert a constitutional crisis by pro-
posing the seventeenth amendment. Thus, even though an article V
convention was never called, the possibility, or .rather the apparent
inevitability, of a national convention eventually compelled Congress
to take action favored by the people. In this manner, then, the alterna-
tive amendment process served precisely the function intended by the
Framers.
49
The most recent effort by the States 'to have Congress call a
43. From 1906 to 1916, twenty-seven petitions were filed to propose an amendment
banning polygamy; from 1939 to 1960, twenty-eight states called for a convention to
limit the taxing power of the federal government; from 1943 to 1949, six states peti-
tioned for a convention on the issue of world federal government; and scattered applica-
tions have been filed on such far flung issues as controlling the Communist Party, bal-
ancing the federal budget and limiting the tenure of federal judges. See State Applica-
tions, supra note 3. See also Graham, 7he Role of the States in Proposing Constltu-
tional Amendments, 49 A.B.A.J. 1175 (1963).
44. "In the [past], application was made by a state because a convention was
thought to be desirable. Beginning with the twentieth century, however, the process has
been used primarily as a prod in the side of Congress to force that body to propose a
specific amendment." W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 105.
45. Id. at 105-13.
46. S. REP. No. 293, supra note 31, at 6.
47. "'In this country, just as soon as a constitutional convention was assembled
they would be seeking to open every door to access and to carry out or make impossible
the carrying out of the fallacies, the fads, and the fancies of the imagination of the peo-
ple who talk about Government and the Constitution of the United States as glibly as
though they knew something about it ..... '" W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 111, quoting
remarks of Senator Heyburn.
48. See State Applications, supra note 3.
49. "The history of the 17th amendment illustrates the usefulness of having a
method by which a recalcitrant Congress can be bypassed when it stands in the way
of the desires of the country for constitutional change." S. REP. No. 293, supra note
31, at 6. Also recall the intentions of the Framers in providing a genuine alternative
to Congress discussed in text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
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national convention came in the 1960's in the wake of the landmark
Supreme Court decisions on the malapportionment of state legislatures.
In 1962 in Baker v. Carr5" the Court held that the issue of state legisla-
tive reapportionment was justiciable, 1 abruptly reversing its long-
standing position to the contrary.52  Baker v. Carr provoked an ex-
plosive reaction among the States. In December 1962 the Council of
State Governments passed resolutions urging state legislatures to
petition Congress for a national convention to consider constitutional
amendments aimed at stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction in mat-
ers of legislative reapportionment.5 3  Then, in 1964 with Reynolds v.
Sims 4 as its flagship case,55 -the Supreme Court established the prin-
ciple of "one-man, one-vote."5 6  Following this decision, the Seven-
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51. "IT)he complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justici-
able constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a
decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 237.
52. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) ("due regard for the
effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."); cf. Radford v. Gary, 352
U.S. 991 (1957) (per curiam); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam);
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (per curiam); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276
(1950) (per curiam); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam); Cole-
grove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675
(1946) (per curiam).
53. The Sixteenth General Assembly of the States, 36 STATE GOV'T 2, 10-15
(1963). The Council passed three resolutions calling for amendment of article V de-
signed to overturn the Baker v. Carr decision and recommended
[that the attached joint resolutions, dealing with proposed amendments to the
United States Constitution be adopted by every State Legislature without
change and in a uniform manner which will leave no question as to the intent
of the several States:
a. A resolution to amend Article V so as to simplify state initiation of
proposed amendments.
b. An amendment to eliminate federal judicial authority over the appor-
tionment of State Legislatures.
c. An amendment to establish a "Court of the Union" with authority to
review Supreme Court decisions relating to the rights reserved to the
States under the Constitution.
Id. at 11. The Council proposals created quite a stir. See, e.g., Caldwell, Freund &
Bernard, Debate of Three Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 53 ILL. B.J. 1040
(1965); Hurst, Memorandum Regarding Pending Proposals to Amend the United States
Constitution, 36 WIs. B. BULL., Aug. 1963, at 7; Monroe, To Preserve the United
States: A Brief for the Negative on Three Current Plans to Amend the Constitution,
8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 533 (1964); Shanahan, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They
Will Strengthen Federal-State Relations, 49 A.B.A.J. 631 (1963).
54. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
55. See also Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo,
377 U.S. 633 (1964).
56. "[A]s a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires
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teenth Biennial General Assembly of the States passed a resolution
urging States to petition Congress for a convention to propose an
amendment that would permit states to apportion one house of a bi-
cameral legislature on some basis other than population. 7  This "quiet
campaign to rewrite the Constitution"58 steadily gained momentum and
was abetted by the active support of certain members of Congress."0
By March 1967, thirty-two states had submitted arguably valid applica-
tions to Congress-only two shy of the magic number representing two-
thirds of the States.60
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of North Carolina then introduced, for
the first time in our nation's history, legislation 1 on article V national
conventions." The Ervin Bill was designed to establish effective pro-
cedures for the calling and functioning of the convention and to de-
lineate carefully the nature and scope of the convention's powers. Un-
fortunately, though the Ervin Bill has twice passed the Senate unani-
mously, it remains languishing in the House Judiciary Committee."
Since 1967 the two additional state applications required to ini-
tiate the article V convention process have not been forthcoming. In-
deed, the possibility of a constitutional convention has now dimmed
considerably since several states have sought to withdraw their applica-
tions. At the present, it seems certain that the two-thirds requirement
will not be met on reapportionment.
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on
a population basis." 377 U.S. at 568.
57. The Seventeenth Biennial General Assembly of the States, 38 STATE Gov'T 39,
62 (1965).
58. Sorenson, The Quiet Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution, 50 SAT. Rtnv., July
15, 1967, at 17.
59. Chief among them was United States Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Il-
linois. See, e.g., Dirksen, The Supreme Court and the People, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 837
(1968).
60. "At this point," Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. recalls, "the situation attracted the
first attention in the press .... The immediate reaction was a rash of newspaper edi-
torials and articles, almost uniformly critical of the effort to obtain a convention, and
a flurry of speeches on the subject in the Congress." Ervin, Proposed Legislation to In-
plement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, 66 MicH. L. Rnv. 875,
877 (1968).
61. S. 2307, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
62. 113 CoNG. REC. 23005 (1967).
63. No action was taken by the Congress until October 19, 1971, when the Ervin
Bill, slightly amended and renumbered, S. 215, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), passed the
Senate eighty-four to nothing. 117 CONG. REc. 36804 (1971). Action by the House
was not forthcoming on the Ervin Bill during the ninety-second congress, and so Senator
Ervin reintroduced the bill, S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in the ninety-third con-
gress in March 1973. 119 CoNG. REc. S. 5017 (daily ed. March 19, 1973). On July
9, 1973, S. 1272 passed the Senate on a voicp vote with no opposition, 119 CQNq. RE,
S. 12728 (daily ed. July 9, 1973),
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The excellent study, research and scholarship fostered by Amer-
ica's flirtation with a constitutional convention during the late 1960's
should not, however, be filed away simply because a convention ap-
pears to be a short-term improbability. Today, in a political atmos-
phere not cankered by partisanship on issues that might be the subject
of state applications, is the perfect time for article V to be considered
on its own merits."4 The serious constitutional problems inherent in
article V's vagueness ought to be resolved in anticipation of a future
time when the Congress finds itself in possession of the required num-
ber of state applications. Given that the amendment process in a con-
stitutional political system should be "perfect," unhappily the pro-
cedure for assembling and conducting the business of an article V con-
vention is not at all clear, precise or perfect. If past experience is any
guide, were a national constitutional convention held today, with no
legislative or other authority to guide and limit its activities, it is doubt-
ful that all segments of the population would accept the product of that
convention as constitutionally binding.65
The most conceptually difficult questions left unanswered by
article V concern the powers of Congress and the federal judiciary over
the convention. Initially, it is essential to define and analyze the power
of Congress, if any, to limit the scope and subject matter of an article
V convention. Secondly, to what extent does the power of the federal
judiciary extend to the amendment process generally and to national
conventions particularly? These twin considerations cannot be re-
solved independently of one another, for any effort made by Congress
to legislate in this field will be limited ultimately by the constitutional
64. There is now in progress, however, a movement to have a convention called
on the issue of forced busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial balance in public
schools. To date, the following twelve states have sent applications to Congress asking.
for a convention on this issue: Alabama, 119 CoNG. REC. S. 15869 (daily ed. Sept. 5,
1973); Delaware, 119 CONG. REc. S. 15869 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1973); Georgia, 119
CONG.-R c. H. 5158 (daily ed. June 21, 1973); Louisiana, 116 CoNG. REC. 5479 (1970),
111 CONG. REC. 164 (1965); Massachusetts, 120 CONG. REc. S. 7035 (daily ed. May 6,
1974); Michigan, 117 CoNG. REc. 41210 (1971); Mississippi, 119 CoNG. Ruc. S. 4839
(daily ed. March 15, 1973), 116 CONG. REC. 6097 (1970); Nevada, 119 CoNo. REc.
S. 9728 (daily ed. May 29, 1973); Oklahoma, 119 CONG. REc. S. 8316 (daily ed. May
7, 1973); Tennessee, 118 CONG. REC. 16214 (1972), 112 CONG. REc. 44 (1966); Texas,
119 CONG. REc. S. 6878 (daily ed. April 10, 1973); Virginia, 119 CONG. REc. H. 2400
(daily ed. April 3, 1973).
65. For example, the movement in the 1960's for a convention in the wake of
Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims led to much bickering over whether a malappor-
tioned state legislature could submit a constitutionally-valid application to Congress on
the issue of its own malapportionment. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 1010 (1967) (remarks
of Senator Tydings).
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power and political disposition of the Supreme Court. When pre-
sented with such legislation the Court might choose to ignore the issue
as properly a "political question,"0 6 to uphold the constitutionality of
the legislation on the merits, or to toss it on the mile-high scrap heap
of congressional dreams wrecked by that relentless engine Judicial Re-
view.
I. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO LIMIT THE SCOPE AND SUBJECT
MATTER OF AN ARTICLE V NATIONAL CONVENTION
The problem of delineating congressional power 7 springs from
the difficulty in reconciling the express language of article V with the
purpose the convention procedure is intended to serve. If the Framers
intended to eliminate Congress entirely from the alternative amend-
ment process, the language of article V is uncharacteristically mis-
leading. The article clearly establishes an important role for Congress
in the convention process. For example, before a convention can be
assembled Congress must first perform an affirmative act in calling for
it.68  It is also Congress and not the convention that determines how
amendments proposed by the convention shall be ratified by the
States.69
On the other hand, the convention procedure was intended to be
an alternative to Congress.7" Therefore, a search for that proper
degree of control that Congress may exert over the convention involves
balancing the unambiguous language of article V against the intent of
the Framers that the two methods of proposing amendments be genu-
ine alternatives.
The desire of some to have Congress limit the scope and subject
matter of a national convention is undoubtedly rooted in -the age-old
fear of the "runaway" convention. 1 This apprehension is most likely
engendered by the rather embarassing realization that our own political
66. See text accompanying notes 130-34 infra.
67. Discussion of Congress' power to limit the convention should focus upon pro-
cedural rather than substantive aspects of the amendment process. There are few con-
stitutional restrictions on the substantive content of a constitutional amendment. See
text accompanying notes 154-55 infra. Procedural uncertainties are the source of diffi-
culty. Thus, the subject-matter validity of an amendment proposed by convention must
be determined in its procedural context.
68. U.S. CoNST. art. V.
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
71. See, e.g., Forkosch, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article f: Reflec-
tions and Suggestions, 51 MINN, L. REv. 1053, 1077 (1967),
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system is acually the product of clearly ultra vires acts committed by
a small group of federalist partisans meeting secretly in Philadelphia
in 1787.72 In complete disregard of -the Articles of Confederation and
their congressional mandate, 73 the delegates to the Philadelphia Con-
vention wrote an entirely new constitution, "the product of a revolution,
bloodless though it was."74  Members of the convention later frankly
admitted that the Convention had acted beyond the scope of its au-
thority, but defended the procedure on grounds of absolute necessity.""
The fear that modem-day convention delegates might fancy themselves
similarly inspired has led many to conclude that Congress should pro-
tect the nation from such a convention by requiring the States to dis-
close in their applications the general subject matter or problem area
to be considered by the convention.76 As a corollary to this point, ad-
vocates of a limited convention would have Congress refuse to submit
for ratification any proposed amendments that deal with any other is-
sue. Others vigorously insist that Congress has no such power.77
This latter group stresses the need for the convention to remain
independent of Congress.78  They acknowledge Congress' function in
calling the convention and prescribing the mode of ratification, but con-
tend that any other authority Congress may have is limited strictly to
routine "housekeeping" functions such as providing for the date, place
and financing of the convention.79 Arguably the purpose of the alter-
native amendment process would be defeated if Congress could impose
substantive restraints disguised as procedure that would effectively
block state access -to the process or that would allow Congress to ob-
72. See, e.g., Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66
MICH. L. Ray. 921, 925 (1968).
73. The mandate of the Philadelphia Convention was expressly limited to propos-
ing amendments to the existing Articles of Confederation. See text accompanying note
16 supra.
74. L. ORFIELD, supra note 8, at 10.
75. Martig, Amending the Constitution Article V: The Keystone of the Arch,
35 MICH. L. REv. 1253, 1257 (1937).
76. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 18; Hearings on S. 2307 Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
233 (1967) (memorandum from Philip B. Kurland to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.); id.
at 46 (remarks of Professor Wallace Mendelson); id. at 36 (remarks of Theodore C.
Sorenson).
77. See, e.g., id. at 231 (letter from Alexander M. Bickel to Professor Philip B.
Kurland); Black, supra note 17.
78. Professor Black contends that the idea that article V conventions can and
ought to be limited in scope is "a child of the twentieth century." Black, Amending
the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 203 (1972).
79. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2307, supra note 76, at 7 (statement of Senator
Hruska).
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struct amendments with which it disagreed. 0 Therefore, the au-
tonomy of the convention must be preserved,8' and Congress must not
impose restrictions inconsistent with the implied requirements of article
V.
8 2
This position finds some support in the debates of the Philadelphia
Convention and in the language of article V itself. The phrase "con-
vention for proposing Amendments,113 using the plural form of the
noun, indicates that the convention might be able to propose as many
amendments as it finds necessary and that Congress is constitutionally
unable to restrict this right. 4  Furthermore, it can be argued that the
Constitution's draftsmen never intended article V to be so narrowly
construed as to limit the power of the convention to propose more than
one amendment. s5
Proponents of an unlimited convention have, in addition, generally
taken the position that Congress may not limit the constitutional effect
of state applications to the subject or issue, if any, stated therein as
the motivation for requesting a convention. Thus, all state applica-
tions, regardless of subject, should be counted together in computing
the two-thirds requirement.8 6 In 1929 the state legislature of Wiscon-
sin concluded that a constitutional convention was long overdue,87 in
the process taking the argument to its extreme. The legislature passed
a joint resolution 8 reminding Congress that since the first petition filed
in 1788,89 a sufficient number of state applications had been submitted
to Congress in the intervening one hundred forty-one years so that,
when counted all together, -the -two-thirds requirement was satisfied.90
The more reasonable inference is that "such petitions must be pre-
80. Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the
United States Constitution, 85 HAMy. L. REv. 1612, 1618 (1972).
81. Platz, Article V of the Federal Constitution, 3 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 17, 46
(1934).
82. Note, 85 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 80, at 1618.
83. U.S. CoNsT. art. V (emphasis added).
84. Forkosch, supra note 71, at 1075.
85. Id. at 1076.
86. See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, supra note 8, at 42; W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 155.
87. Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26
NoTRE DAmE LAW. 185, 195 (1951). See also 71 CONG. REc. 3369 (1929).
88. STATE OF WISCONSIN JOINT RESOLUTION 83 (Sept. 23. 1929). FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, S. Doc. No. 78, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1930).
89. See generally W. Pullen, supra note 14, at 145.
90. The resolution then requested "that the Congress of the United States perform
the mandatory duty imposed upon it by the above quoted Article V and forthwith call
a convention -to propose amendments to the constitution of the United States....
STATE OF WISCONSIN JoINT RESOLUTION 83, supra note 88, at 32.
506 [Vol. 53
AMENDMENT BY CONVENTION
sented within a sufficiently reasonable time to justify the belief that
they represented the state of public, sentiment at the time." '91
The arguments put forward by those who find in article V a re-
quirement for an unlimited convention reveal a certain fascination for
the concept of a national convention and betray an exaggerated notion
of the proper powers of a truly constitutional convention. As Cyril
Brickfield has noted, "[ihose who deny that Congress has the power
to bind a convention rely heavily on the so-called doctrine of 'conven-
tional sovereignty.' "92 And as Senator Heyburn explained on the floor
of the Senate in 1911: "When the people of the United States meet
in a constitutional convention there is no power to limit their action.
They are greater than the Constitution, and they can repeal the pro-
vision that limits the right of amendment. They can repeal every sec-
tion of it, because they are the peers of the people who made it."
'9 3
Supporters of this doctrine of conventional sovereignty attempt to
soothe fears of a runaway convention by correctly pointing out that a
convention can only propose amendments, not ratify them."4 Although
the convention would have no power to change the Constitution, it
would have the complete power to propose changes. Therefore, when
one speaks of an "unlimited convention" this means only that the Con-
vention would be free to propose amendments on any subject it saw
fit. Ratification of these proposals by the States would still be re-
quired.
91. Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 ILL. L. REV. 782, 794
(1927). See also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921); text accompanying notes
19-20 supra.
92. C. BcKFEmLD, supra note 13, at 16.
93. 46 CONG. REC. 2769 (1911). Cyril Brickfield has noted that
[a]ccording to this [Heyburn's] theory, a convention is, in effect, a premier
assembly of the people, a representative body charged by the people with the
duty of framing the basic law of the land, for which purpose there devolves
upon it all the power which the people themselves possess. In short, that for
the particular business of amending and revising our Constitution, the conven-
tion is possessed of sovereign powers and therefore is supreme to all other Gov-
ernment branches or agencies.
C. BCR KFIELD, supra note 13, at 16.
94. The power of the convention is thus viewed as equal to, but not greater than
that of Congress. The convention can only set into motion the amendment process in
the same sense as Congress, which is free at any time to propose any amendment what-
ever upon which two-thirds of both Houses agree. "Why does not this Congress amend
in every conceivable manner the Constitution . . . ? It can propose amendments all
over the place if it wants to. Why does not this Congress run away in its effort to
amend the Constitution? Common sense and good faith restrains it. For the same rea-
son I would be very confident and extend every good faith to the representatives in a
national convention." 113 CONG. REc. 10113 (1967) (remarks of Senator Hruska). See
also Hearings on S. 2307, supra note 11, at 7.
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On the other hand, a compelling argument can be made that the
power of amendment in article V is itself constitutionally limited.9
This approach sees article V as only one part of a fragile and delicately
balanced political structure in which the equilibrium between article
V's express language and the need for an independent convention is
more properly weighted in favor of greater congressional control.
Thus Congress should have the power to restrict the convention to
those amendments that dealt with the general issue or problem that
had inspired two-thirds of the States to call for a convention."
The conceptual framework for this approach to article V appears
in Judge Jameson's classic treatise on constitutional conventions. 9
Central to Jameson's analysis in his distinction between the revolution-
95. One of the first acts of the fledgling Congress under the new Constitution was
designed to make clear that the overall authority of the Constitution was superior to the
power to amend contained in article V. In 1789, reacting to amendments proposed by
James Madison, Roger Sherman objected to the idea of interweaving amendments into
the text of the original Constitution, urging that the latter sprang from a higher author-
ity than the amending power. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707-08 (1789). Accordingly, Sher-
man suggested that the original text of the Constitution be left undisturbed, and that
amendments be proposed as supplementary to it. Id. Sherman's proposal eventually
prevailed, and the precedent thus created has been followed ever since. Amendments
appear as additions to the original document, as is illustrated, by way of example, by
the eleventh amendment, which clearly supersedes the original language of portions of
article Ill.
96. Within this general area the convention would have a free hand to propose any
amendment it felt necessary to resolve the problem. Outside that area the convention
would have no power to act, and Congress might justifiably refuse to submit to the
States for ratification any ultra vires amendment proposal. See, e.g., STAFF OF Housi
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE APPLI-
CATIONS FOR A CONVENTION TO PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL
TAX RATES 16 (Comm. Print 1952).
The Ervin Bill, discussed in note 63 supra, would require a valid state application
to specify "the nature of the amendment or amendments to be proposed," S. 1272, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973), and would give Congress the power to refuse to submit
for ratification an amendment proposed by the convention "because such proposed
amendment relates to or includes a subject which differs from or was not included
among the subjects named or described in the concurrent resolution of the Congress
by which the convention was called . . . ." Id. § I I(b) (1) (B).
The Ervin Bill is likewise careful to preserve the right of a state to call for a general
revision of the Constitution. S. REP. No. 293, supra note 31, at 1. Those who favor
a limited convention do not deny or doubt a power in the States to call for a wide-open
convention to propose amendments which, if ratified, would amount to a general revision
of the Constitution. They do insist, however, that a general convention should not be
called unless the States expressly ask for one. That is, there should be general popular
dissatisfaction with the Constitution and a national consensus for wide-ranging reform.
Such a consensus should not be inferred from the fact that two-thirds of the States had
applied for a convention on a variety of different subjects. See, e.g., Hearings on S.
2307, supra note 11, at 67 (remarks of Professor Bickel); Bonfield, supra note 18;
Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MIcH. L. REV.
903 (1968).
97. J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (4th ed. 1887).
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ary and the constitutional convention. A revolutionary convention
consists of those bodies of men who, in times of political crisis, as-
sume, or have cast upon them, provisionally, the function of gov-
ernment. They either supplant or supplement the existing govern-
mental organization ... [t]hey are not subaltern or ancillary
to any other institution whatever, but lords paramount of the en-
tire political domain. . . . In short, a Revolutionary Convention
is simply a PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. 98
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 meets all of Jameson's cri-
teria for a revolutionary convention.9 9 Likewise Jameson implies that
most state constitutional conventions held during the independence
movement were clearly revolutionary.100
In opposition to the revolutionary convention is the constitutional
convention.
It differs from the [revoluntary convention] in being, as its name
implies, constitutional; not simply as having for its object the fram-
ing or amending of Constitutions, but as being within, rather than
without, the pale of the fundamental law; as ancillary and subservi-
ent and not hostile and paramount to it. . . . It is charged with a
definite, and not a discretionary and indeterminate, function. It
always acts under a commission, for a purpose ascertained and
limited by law or by custom. .. . It never supplants the existing
organization. It never governs.' 01
Jameson then notes that the two concepts are mutually exclusive,
and that a convention may not at the same time claim to be a constitu-
tional convention while exercising revolutionary powers.' 2 He objects
to the doctrine of conventional sovereignty, calling it promotive of "a
degree of omnipotence to which, in a government of law, there can
be found no parallel, and which is inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of American liberty." 03 Using Jameson's terminology,
plainly article V contemplates a constitutional convention as opposed
to a revolutionary one.104
98. Id. at 6.
99. Although Jameson is loath to admit it. See id. at 377-80.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 10.
102. Jameson contends that a convention which at any stage of its proceedings over-
reaches itself becomes ab initio a revolutionary convention. Id. at 10-11.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66
MIcH. L. REV. 949, 994 (1968). For example, Jameson postulates that the legislative
branch retains considerable power over a convention. As to routine housekeeping mat-
ters, "it is in general the right and the duty of a legislature to prescribe when, and where,
and how a Convention shaU meet and proceed with its business. ... ." J. JAmEsoN, su-
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The Jameson analysis is widely accepted, 05 for it blends more
smoothly into our constitutional system and more accurately reflects
both the expectations of -the Framers and the practical realities of
modem American politics. Properly understood, the power to amend
the Constitution expressed by article V is a constitutionally limited
power and can have only the effect that the Constitution, taken as a
whole, permits. 10 6 The express limitations set out in the language of
article V contradict the theory that the power to amend springs from
the same source as the Constitution itself.
The Founding Fathers apparently felt that, although the Consti-
tution was fundamentally sound, certain defects would be certain to
emerge. Thus article V was included as a device by which -the Consti-
tution could be adapted to new realities and situations while leaving
certain indispensable rights and freedoms undisturbed.10 7  Hamilton in
The Federalist remarked that "every amendment to -the constitution,
if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be
pra note 97, at 365. On the broader question of congressional power generally, he refers
to the legislative branch as "the sentinel on duty," charged with protecting the republic
against a runaway convention, an obligation which the legislature "cannot rightfully ab-
dicate." Id. Furthermore, the legislature, and only the legislature, "has a clear consti-
tutional right, in its discretion, to prescribe the scope of duties of the Convention it
calls. . . ." Id. at 364.
105. See, e.g., C. BRICKIELD, supra note 13; Bonfield, supra note 104; Gilliam,
Constitutional Conventions: Precedents, Problems, and Proposals, 16 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 46 (1971).
106. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 347-49 (1855). Further-
more, the restrictions upon amendment imposed by article V itself contradict the theory
that the power to amend springs from the same source as the Constitution. For exam-
ple, article V clearly prohibited any amendment before 1808 which would have inter-
fered with the African slave trade. Article V also forbids any amendment that would
deprive any State of its equal representation in the Senate without its consent. Arguably
the Senate could be reorganized on some basis other than equal representation for every
State, but this could be accomplished only if every State in the Union consented to the
change, for article V's prohibition applies only insofar as a change is attempted without
the consent of a State. To illustrate, reorganization of the Senate on some basis other
than equal representation can be accomplished under the Constitution. Yet such a
change cannot be made under the proposal/ratification procedure in article V. If only
one State, for example, failed to ratify an amendment changing the representation for-
mula of the Senate, then presumably that State could not be compelled to accept the
change, even though ratified by three-fourths of the other States. Likewise, if all fifty
States indicated their consent to the change in some manner acceptable to all, but differ-
ent from the ratification process of article V, then such an expression of consent might
be sufficient to amend effectively article I of the Constitution. The power and proce-
dure of amendment under article V are thus not exclusive, reinforcing the idea that the
power to amend is constitutionally limited.
107. Madison, in The Federalist, speaks of article V only in relation to the "amend-
ment of errors," and suggests a constitutionally limited power of amendment by noting
that the article is "under two exceptions." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 315 (B. Wright
ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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brought forward singly. . . There can therefore be no comparison
between the facility of effecting an amendment, and that of establishing
in the first instance a complete constitution.'
10 8
When taken as a constitutionally limited power of amendment,
article V must be made consistent with other powers created and
distributed by the Constitution, and, in particular, the power to amend
must be reconciled with the power of Congress. For example, al-
though article V is silent on Congress' ability to restrict a convention,
persuasive authority for the existence of such powers is found in 'the
general grant of legislative authority in article I. The broad scope of
the "necessary and proper"'09 clause was first sketched out in 1816 by
the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee."10 The Court held
that:
The constitution unavoidably deals in general language ...
Hence, its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the
legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate
legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its
powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should re-
quire."'
As Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court three years later
in McCulloch v. Maryland:"2
[T]here is no phrase in the Constitution which, like the articles of
confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which
requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely
described.
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the con-
stitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 13
One hundred -two years later the Supreme Court applied the prin-
ciples established in these two cases directly to the scope of congres-
sional power in 'the amendment process. In Dillon v. Gloss" 4 the
Court held that the necessary and proper clause authorized Congress
to impose time limits upon the ratification process." 5  Thus -the as-
108. Id. No. 85, at 545 (A. Hamilton).
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
110. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
111. Id. at 326-27.
112. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
113. Id. at 406, 421.
114. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
115. "As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal
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sumption that Congress has a broad power to fashion the ground rules
for the convention and. to prescribe basic procedures is well founded." 0
There is, then, a close relationship between the principal congres-
sional power conferred under article V and the supporting or ancillary
powers, conferred under the necessary and proper clause, to execute
the principal power.117  Without this supporting power, the principal
power could not exist.":8  These powers apply not only to procedural
functions such as calling the convention, but also extend to the vital
function of determining the ultimate scope of the convention." 9
Although the unlimited convention concept does attempt to
guarantee a convention as independent of Congress as is constitution-
ally possible, in doing so it rides roughshod over an equally compelling
element of the amendment process. As noted above, 120 regardless of
the procedure used, the Framers clearly intended that amendments be
proposed only when there exists a broad national consensus for change.
While the two-thirds supermajority required before Congress may pro-
pose amendments is a proper measure of this consensus, an inde-
pendent, wide-open convention could easily be the source of proposals
that reflect no national consensus at all. Accordingly, the notion that
all state applications should be counted together in computing the two-
thirds requirement for a convention seems to contradict the need for
a national consensus. Equally inconsistent is the argument that the
convention, once assembled, is free to propose amendments on any
subject it chooses.' 2' Manifestly, it is more reasonable to conclude that
Congress, having been delegated the exclusive authority to call the con-
with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may re-
quire; and Article V is no exception to the rule." Id. at 376 (footnote omitted).
116. Kauper, supra note 96, at 906. "The national legislature is obviously the most
appropriate body for exercising a supervisory authority, for the duty to call a convention
necessarily embraces the authority to determine whether the conditions which create the
duty are satisfied." Id. at 906-07.
117. C. BRiCK.FmLD, supra note 13, at 19.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
121. As a 1952 House Judiciary Committee Staff Report concluded,
To argue that Congress must launch the cumbersome, costly, and confusing
proceedings of a national convention whenever 32 States fortuitously submit
resolutions requesting a convention for one purpose or another does not seem
sound when viewed from a realistic standpoint. . . . [Tlo tiansform every pe-
tition asking for a specific remedial amendment into a request for a general
convention by classifying it with every other application asking for constitu-
tional change would constitute a strained interpretation of article V wholly at
variance with the present needs and desires of the States.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 96, at 11.
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vention, has the power to see to it that all required elements of the
amendment process, including the national consensus, are present be-
fore issuing such a call. Practically speaking, Congress should not
count all applications together regardless of -timeliness or subject mat-
ter. Moreover, Congress should require that the nature of a particu-
lar problem be stated in the language of the state application and
should refuse to submit for ratification amendments proposed by -the
convention unrelated to that problem. Only in this way can the Con-
stitution's national consensus requirement be fulfilled. The inde-
pendence of the convention can be protected by giving the convention
a totally free hand to propose any and all amendments it deems neces-
sary that reasonably relate to the general problem area or subject mat-
ter stated in the applications.
Ironically, the wide-open convention approach, which in the ab-
stract seems to facilitate the convention mode of proposing amend-
ments, would in all probability have precisely the opposite effect.122
States that desire constitutional changes only within a particular prob-
lem area will be more reluctant to petition Congress for a convention
if they know -that their limited applications will be counted together
with others dealing with completely different subjects.12
3
In conclusion, an analysis of congressional power over the alterna-
tive procedure of article V must take into account the three requisite
conditions in the amendment process: perfection, national consensus,
and deliberation and debate over a national forum. Additionally, the
independence of the convention from Congress must be preserved.
Both the congressional and convention procedures satisfy the national
forum requirement. The unlimited convention approach emphasizes
the independence of the convention, but in so doing loses sight of the
need for national consensus, thereby creating the possibility that the
perfection of the amendment process will be spoiled by the proposal
of amendments that do not reflect the national mood. The proper
balance between congressional power and conventional independence
can be achieved, however, by an acknowledgement of the power of
Congress to limit the subject matter of the convention, but a denial of
any power in Congress to interfere with or limit the convention in pro-
122. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 60, at 883.
123. "Indeed, the usefulness of the alternative amendment procedure as a means of
dealing with a specific grievance on the part of the states will be defeated if the states
are told that it can be invoked only at the price of subjecting the nation to all the prob-
lems, expense, and risks involved in having a wide open constitutional convention."
Kauper, supra note 96, at 911-12; see, e.g., S. REP1. No. 293, supra note 31, at 9.
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posing any and all amendments within that general area. This analysis,
it is submitted, successfully integrates all relevant policy considerations
germane to the amendment process generally and would provide a
climate in which the states could take advantage of the alternative proc-
ess with hope for success and without fear of provoking a serious consti-
tutional crisis.1
2 4
1Il. THE CouRTS AND ARTICLE V
A. Introduction
The second great mystery shrouding article V involves the latent
power of 'the federal courts over a constitutional convention. The
powers of Congress must be considered in light of the justiciability
of issues arising under article V, for it is in the courts that the issue
of congressional authority will finally be decided. Should the courts
find these issues justiciable, any attempt by Congress to control the
convention will most surely be made in anticipation of how the Su-
preme Court might react. On the other hand, if these problems are
found non-justiciable, the only check upon congressional power will be
the good faith of Congress itself.
125
At first blush it seems axiomatic that the great constitutional is-
sues raised by article V are within the scope of the judicial power.
There are those who suggest that an issue is rightly before a federal
court when its resolution depends upon the construction of the laws
or Constitution 26 of the United States, 21 for "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution .... ."121
Under this view, any question involving the amendment procedure in
124. This is the approach taken by the Ervin Bill, S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess,
(1973), discussed in note 63 supra. See also S. REP. No. 293, supra note 31, at 6-7.
125. Concededly, the Congress cannot be forced by the courts or by the pro-
visions of this bill to convene a convention when the constitutional prerequi-
sites have been satisfied. And since the obligation to call the convention is
given to Congress, neither the President nor the Supreme Court could act in
its stead. However, every Member of Congress has taken an oath to support
the Constitution and it is inconceivable that Congress would refuse to perform
its duty. No adequate argument has been brought forth to suggest a different
conclusion.
S. REp. No. 293, supra note 31, at 9.
126. "mhe basic operating principle of American federalism [is] that the ultimate
determination of federal constitutional questions rests with the Supreme Court of the
United States . . . ." Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: The Con-
federating Proposals, 52 GEo. L.J 1, 38 (1963).
127. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821).
128. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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article V presents a federal question that must ultimately be decided
by the Supreme Court.12 9
But the issue of judicial authority and article V is not so easily
resolved, for over the years the federal courts have imposed upon
themselves restrictions in certain areas of constitutional law. The
"political questions" doctrine, 0 for example, is a theory of judicial
self-restraint whereby the courts refuse to find many constitutional is-
sues' 3 ' justiciable on the grounds that the subject matter involved is
more suited to the "political departments" of the government. 182
Through the years the standards formulated by the Supreme Court for
determining which issues present nonjusticiable political questions have
reflected the Court's self-perception of its own authority. In 1962 the
Court substantially revised its approach to political questions,' and the
new guidelines' put forward have thickened the fog of uncertainty
shadowing the justiciability of ,the amendment process.
To further exacerbate the problem, since there has never been
an article V convention, the Supreme Court has never had reason to
focus its attention directly upon the subject. However, the Court has
on numerous occasions considered questions raised by the amendment
process generally. As a result, an inquiry into the power of the judici-
ary over national conventions must proceed in -two parts: first, a review
of past cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled on issues regarding
constitutional amendment generally; second, a bit of speculation as to
how the Court might react to particular problems springing from a
national convention.
129. In re Opinions of the Justices, 204 N.C. 806, 809, 172 S.E. 474, 476 (1933).
130. See generally C. WiGHT, HANDBOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 14
(2d ed. 1970); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
131. For example, the Court has determined that the issue of the validity of the
Constitution itself is non-justiciable. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849).
132. 'The non-justiciability of a political question is founded primarily on the doc-
trine of separation of powers and the policy of judicial self-restraint." C. WwGoT, supra
note 130, § 14, at 45. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-
66 (1803) (Marshall, CJ.).
133. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the poten-
tiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
Id. at 217.
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B. Justiciability of the Amendment Process
Although state courts have almost uniformly held that the question
of amendment of state constitutions is justiciable,3 1 the federal courts
have been somewhat less than confident in handling the subject, and
the Supreme Court has left a trail of confusing decisions.1 0 During
the nineteenth century, 3 7 the drift of Supreme Court opinions tended
toward nonjusticiability. 38  With the exception of a 1798 case, 13 in
which neither the parties nor the Court considered the issue, 40 the
Court generally was of the opinion that, with regard to constitutional
amendments, "the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political
department of the government, and is concluded by it.' 4'
It was not until after the turn of the century that the Supreme
Court tipped the scales of justiciability in the opposite direction.1
42
The Court asserted its power in a number of cases to decide positively
several issues of constitutional amendment law, obviously confident of
its authority to pass upon both procedural and substantive aspects of
the amendment process.'4 3
135. See, e.g., Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854); Carton v. Secretary of State,
151 Mich. 337, 115 N.W. 429 (1908); Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874).
136. See, e.g., Annot., 122 A.L.R. 717 (1939); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1321 (1933); An-
not., 83 A.L.R. 1374 (1933).
137. The Supreme Court was for the first time confronted with the issue! rf the
validity of a constitutional amendment in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
378 (1798). See note 140 infra.
138. In 1849, Chief Justice Taney strongly hinted that constitutional amendments
presented nonjusticiable political questions. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39,
47 (1849). Nevertheless, in 1855 Justice Wayne concluded that the power to amend
the Constitution is a constitutionally limited one. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331, 348 (1855). In 1871 the Court, in an aside, held that insofar as the valid ty
of the Civil War Amendments was concerned, action by Congress was conclusive upon
the courts. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646. 649 (1871).
139. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
140. Neither party to the suit maintained that the issue of constitutional amendment
ought to be a political question, and the Court, in its brief five-line opinion, did not
discuss the problem. See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, supra note 8, at 7.
141. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1871).
142. First of the twentieth century amendment cases was Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915), in which it was argued that the fifteenth amendment was invalid insofar
as it applied to state or municipal elections, on the grounds that when so applied the
amendment had the effect of depriving the state of its equal representation in the Senate.
Id. at 374. The Court ignored the point.
143. In Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), the Court held that constitutional
amendments can be ratified only in the manner provided for by Congress and that the
role of the state legislature in the ratifying process is a federal function, derived not from
the people of that State, but rather from the United States Constitution. The Court also
reaffirmed Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798), that the decision
of the Congress to propose an amendment to the States for ratification was not subject
to the veto power of the President. See id. at 381 (the famous footnote by Justice
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Perhaps the most important case in the area of justiciability of con-
stitutional amendment issues came in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller.14
This case involved the validity of Kansas' ratification of the proposed
Child Labor Amendment and is significant in that the Court expressly
found two areas of constitutional amendment law nonjusticiable. The
Court held that the effect of a previous rejection of an amendment by
a State "should be regarded as a political question." 14 5 The Court also
held that the validity of a State's ratification of a proposed amendment




Despite protests by the Solicitor General that the issues presented were nonjusticia-
ble, in the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920), the Court ruled that the
substantive content of the eighteenth amendment was within the scope of the amendment
power and that the amendment had been properly adopted. The Court also held that
the required two-thirds vote in each house is a vote by two-thirds of those members pres-
ent, presuming a quorum, and not a vote by two-thirds of the total elected membership.
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), held that constitutional amendments must be
ratified within a reasonable time after they are proposed, and that Congress has the
power to set a reasonable time limit upon the ratification process. Query: does Con-
gress also have the power to set time limits for ratification of amendments proposed by
convention?
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), and Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130
(1922), both involved the validity of the nineteenth amendment. In the former case
the Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
amendment prior to its ratification by the States. In the latter case, the Court held that
equal suffrage was a proper subject for amendment under article V, and restated the fed-
eral function of state legislatures in ratifying proposed amendments. At this point, how-
ever, the Court's engine of justiciability ran out of steam. The opinion revived the polit-
ical question doctrine to hold that the proclamation of an amendment by the Secretary
of State is conclusive upon the courts. Id. at 137.
In Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36 (1925), the Court held that, although by its
own terms the eighteenth amendment would not go into force until one year from the
date of ratification, the amendment itself became effective upon its ratification. As a
result, Congress was held to have power to legislate in anticipation of enforcement of
the amendment and was not obliged to wait until the year had expired.
Six years later, in United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931), the Court re-
jected the argument that amendments dealing with personal rights and individual liber-
ties must be ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures. The Court ex-
pressly held that regardless of the substantive content of a proposed amendment, Con-
gress has the unqualified power to choose the one or the other method of ratification.
Id. at 732. More importantly, the language of the opinion is such as to induce the belief
that the Court regarded the amending process as generally justiciable. L. OpFIELD, su-
pra note 8, at 18.
The effect of the absolute repeal of a constitutional amendment was the issue in
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934). The Court first took judicial notice
of the ratification of the twenty-first amendment and then declared the eighteenth
amendment "inoperative," id. at 223, holding that "neither the Congress nor the courts
could give it continued vitality," id. at 222.
144. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
145. Id. at 450.
146. The Court distinguished Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (121), by noting that
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The case owes its fame, however, to the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Black,147 who contended that the entire constitutional amendment
process was nonjusticiable:
To -the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the
exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and
ratification of amendments we are unable to agree.
. . . The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitu-
tion in some respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as
subject to -the final authority of the Congress .... No such divi-
sion between the political and judicial branches of the government
is made by Article V which grants power over the amending of the
Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process
'has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to Con-
gress. The process itself is "political" in its entirety, from submis-
sion until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is
not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point.
Congress, possessing exclusive power over the amending proc-
ess, cannot be bound by and is under no duty to accept the pro-
nouncements upon that exclusive power by this Court or by the
Kansas courts. Neither state nor federal courts can review that
power. Therefore, any judicial expression amounting to more
than mere acknowledgment of exclusive Congressional power over
the political process of amendment is a mere admonition to the
Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion, given wholly without
constitutional authority.
148
in Dillon the Court had merely upheld Congress' determination that seven years would
be the maximum period for ratification. In Coleman, Congress had imposed no such
time limit, and the Supreme Court was reluctant to provide one, concluding it lacked
the proper criteria for such a determination. It held that the issue "can be decided by
the Congress with the full knowledge and appreciation ascribed to the national legisla-
ture of the political, social and economic conditions which have prevailed during the pe-
riod since the submission of the amendment." 307 U.S. at 454.
In a fit of schizophrenia, however, the Court expressly declined to hold nonjustifi-
able whether the lieutenant governor is part of the "legislature" as contemplated by arti-
cle V. The majority opinion noted that the Court was "equally divided" on the issue,
and "therefore the Court expresses no opinion upon that point." Id. at 447. The prac-
tical difficulties presented by an "equally divided" nine-man Court are discussed, tongue-
in-cheek, in Note, Sawing a Justice in Half, 48 YALE L.J. 1455 (1939). It appears, how-
ever, that no High Court prestidigitation was involved, for Mr. Justice McReynolds was
absent on the day of decision. See, e.g., 28 GEo. L.J. 199, 200 n.7 (1939).
147. He was joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas.
148. 307 U.S. at 458-60. Black and Douglas clung to their convictions in the com-
panion case of Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939), where they stated in a concur-
ring opinion that "we do not believe that state or federal courts have any jurisdiction
to interfere with the amending process." Id, at 478.
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The impact of Coleman v. Miller has been enormous. Some com-
mentators have concluded, presumably on the basis of Black's concur-
ring opinion, that -the case stands for the complete repudiation of judi-
cial power over the amendment process.' 49 A number of lower federal
courts have so interpreted the case.150 However, viewed in its histori-
cal context and given the proliferation of opinions filed in the case,
Coleman v. Miller more properly appears to offer extremely weak
precedential authority for advocates of nonjusticiability. Since it did
not overrule earlier cases such as Dillon v. Gloss,'5' and since the Court
based its holding on the particular relevance of the economic and social
issues involved, Coleman v. Miller clearly does not stand for the propo-
sition that absolute nonjusticiability attaches -to all questions related
to the amendment process. 52 As Professor Orfield remarked, "[i]f
the Supreme Court is not ready to apply the doctrine of political ques-
tions to all phases of the amending process. . . it will apply it -to some
phases of the amending process and what such phases are remains
largely uncertain."' 53
In 1967 the Supreme Court again touched upon the substantive
content of constitutional amendments. In Whitehill v. Elkins,' 4 Jus-
tice Douglas observed -that "the Constitution prescribes the method of
'alteration' by the amending process in Article V; and while the pro-
cedure for amending it is restricted, there is no restraint on the kind
of amendment that may be offered.' 
5
The cases thus reveal three distinct periods in which the attitude
of the Supreme Court toward the justiciability of amendment issues has
shifted to and fro. In the cases decided in the eighteenth -and nine-
teenth centuries, with the exception of Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 56 the
Court tended to view article V as a political issue. Then, in the nation-
wide turmoil over both the eighteenth and nineteenth amendments, the
Court jumped headlong into the amendment business, apparently un-
149. See, e.g., Dixon, Article Y: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitu-
tion?, 66 MiCr. L. Rpv. 931 (1968).
150. See, e.g., Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md.
1967); United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954).
151. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
152. See Note, 85 HAv. L. REv., supra note 80, at 1636.
153. L. ORImLD, supra note 8, at 36.
154. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
155. Id. at 57.
156. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). But recall that the political question issue was
not raised in this case. See text accompanying notes 145-46 supra.
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moved by protests of nonjusticiability. 157  And then, just as suddenly,
in Coleman v. Miller15 8 the Court reversed its ground, reverting to the
idea of nonjusticiability and political questions, and coming within a
whisper of declaring all issues involving -the amendment process
beyond the scope of the judicial power. In the confused aftermath of
Coleman v. Miller, the historical record of the Supreme Court can be
all things to all men.
Advocates of nonjusticiability emphasize the uniqueness of the
amendment process in that it provides the American people with their
only means of correcting "errors" in the Supreme Court's interpretation
of -the Constitution. 59 They argue that since the only way to overturn
an unpopular Supreme Court decision is by Constitutional amend-
ment,1 0 the Court and all lower federal courts should decline to inter-
fere with the amendment process.
Those who favor justiciability insist that all questions of constitu-
tional law should be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court, and
stress that the Court cannot be coerced into acting upon the basis of
any amendment which it does not believe has the force of law.10 1
Theoretically, the power to adjudicate amendments is identical to the
power to declare laws unconstitutional.' 62 Once the Court determines
in good conscience that it does have jurisdiction, the argument con-
tinues, there is no power in the "political department" capable of
stopping the judiciary from hearing the case and deciding the issue. 103
In conclusion, it seems reasonable to assume the present inclina-
tion of the Supreme Court would be to favor justiciability. Since Cole-
man, the Court has reworked its entire conceptual approach to political
questions.' 64  Baker v. Carr,165 for example, strongly suggests that the
157. See note 143 supra.
158. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
159. Note, 85 HARv. L. REv., supra note 80, at 1640 n.140.
160. Indeed, the eleventh, fourteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth amendments all op-
erated to nullify prior Supreme Court decisions, and had the Child Labor Amendment
been ratified, it would have had the same effect. See, e.g., I. BARRON & A. HoLTzHOFvF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.1, at 303 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
161. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). See also Black, supra note 78, at 211.
162. L. ORFiELD, supra note 8, at 13.
163. "The issue is whether Congress may tell the courts, state or federal, that they
may not inquire into certain issues of law, in cases where they do have jurisdiction. Un-
less the whole theory of Marbury v. Madison is wrong, it is inconceivable that Congress
has such power." Black, supra note 78, at 211.
164. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See note 134 supra.
165. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Court will not remain the shrinking violet of the Coleman v. Miller era,
and possibly forecasts an expanded role for the federal courts in pre-
viously uncharted "political thickets." It would appear that many
potential amendment-related issues would not fall within the class held
by Baker v. Carr 'to constitute political questions, 6 and in the Court's
own words, "[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability ....
C. Justiciability of Issues Raised by National Conventions
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on any aspect of the
alternative amendment process. Should a national convention ever be
called, however, there could arise any number of legal challenges to
the power of the federal judiciary over that amendment procedure.
For purposes of discussion, then, the amendment process in general
will be presumed to be justiciable.' 6 The discussion is thus left free
to focus upon the particular problems raised by a constitutional conven-
tion and to speculate about which of these could ultimately be resolved
in the courts.
A serious question looms at the very threshold: the power of the
courts to compel the doing of an affirmative act by an elected Congress.
This problem might arise in at least two obvious contexts: first, if Con-
gress refused to call a convention, despite submission of a sufficient
number of arguably valid state applications to warrant such an act; sec-
ond, if Congress refused to submit proposed amendments for ratifica-
tion on the grounds that the convention had exceeded its authority. In
these situations, can Congress be forced to act?
As to the initial calling of the convention, it was without question
the understanding of the Framers that the duty imposed upon the Con-
gress in article V is mandatory rather than discretionary. 1 9 The ex-
press language of article V requires that Congress "shall call a Con-
vention."' 70  In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,171 the Supreme Court con-
166. See generally Note, 85 HARv. L. R-v., supra note 80.
167. 369 U.S. at 217.
168. See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
169. "[Tjhe national rulers, whenever nine states concur, will have no option upon
the subject. . . . The words of this article [IV are peremptory. The Congress 'shall
call a convention.' Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And
of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air."
THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 546 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added).
170. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
171. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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strued the word "shall" in its constitutional context as having mandatory
effect.17 2  As a result, a number of commentators have generalized
that in the two circumstances mentioned above, a coercive writ of man-
damus should issue to compel Congress in the first instance, to call the
convention, and later to submit all amendments proposed by the con-
vention -to the States for ratification. 173  During the height of the reap-
portionment controversy, 174 when it seemed inevitable that two-thirds
of the States would apply for a convention, Senators Dirksen and
Hruska vigorously argued for such a broad interpretation of the judicial
power, 75 citing as authority Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madi-
son. 7 6  They claimed that Marbury stood for mandamus as a proper
remedy to compel -the doing of nondiscretionary, purely ministerial
acts. 77  At least one authority has concluded that given a refusal by
Congress to perform the acts required of it by article V, the Supreme
Court itself should call the convention.17
This position distorts and exaggerates the power of the federal
judiciary and brutalizes the doctrine of separation of powers. The Su-
preme Court, in contrast, has traditionally upheld the inherent limita-
tions upon the judiciary. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 79 the Court, in
refusing to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from executing certain
Reconstruction Acts, held that "the Congress is the legislative depart-
ment of the government; -the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial Department.
•.' . Accordingly, the courts have never issued an injunction or
172. "[Wqhenever a particular object is to be effected, the language of the constitu-
tion is always imperative, and cannot be disregarded, without violating the first princi-
ples of public duty." Id. at 327-33.
173. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 72; Dirksen, supra note 59; Packard, Legal Facets
of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 Clu.-KENT L. Rnv. 128 (1952); Tuller,
A Convention to Amend the Constitution-Why Needed-How May It Be Obtained?,
CXCIII N. AM. REV. 369 (1911).
174. See text accompanying notes 50-63 supra.
175. See, e.g., Dirksen, supra Aote 59; 113 COM. Rlc. 12267 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Hruska).
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
177. See, e.g., 113 CoNG. RFc. 12272 (1967) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
178. "A deliberate refusal *on the part of Congress to call a convention, once the
requisite number of state applications were in hand, may be expected, by enlarged anal-
ogy to what has been done in the recent civil rights cases and what is being proposed
in the electoral apportionment cases, to bring into play the powers of the Supreme Court
to direct the setting up of the national convention." Carson, supra note 72, at 921, But
cf. Kauper, supra note 96, at 906 ("[ find it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court
would. .. take it upon itself to prescribe the procedures for a convention").
179. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
180. Id. at 500.
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writ of mandamus directly against the President or the Congress.181
The better view is that article V imposes an "imperfect obliga-
tion' 18 2 upon Congress in which the duty is defined, but the sanction
is withheld. Accordingly, while Congress has a clear constitutional
obligation under article V, the courts will not compel the discharge of
that duty.183  The proper remedy for congressional inaction is that
which congressmen know best and fear most-the ballot box.18 4
In a similar vein, the power of the courts to enjoin the proceedings
of the convention once assembled poses a crucial problem. Numerous
charges could be raised to present an attractive case for injunctive re-
lief. For example, it could be alleged that -the petitions used as a basis
181. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 672. As Professor Dodd has written:
Although there are elements of judicial enforceability in certain constitutional
provisions requiring affirmative legislative action, these elements are usually
not present, and where they are, courts are loath to take advantage of them.
In general, therefore, constitutional provisions that the legislature "shall" do a
certain thing are equivalent to statements that the legislature "may" or "shall
have the power." The Federal Constitution provides that Congress, "on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a
convention for proposing amendments" to the constitution, but there is no com-
pulsion upon Congress to call a convention.
Dodd, Judicially Non-enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 82
(1931).
182. Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42 HAV. L. REv. 1015, 1018 (1929).
183. Wheeler, supra note 91, at 792. It has been suggested that the doctrine estab-
lished in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), has not been scrupu-
lously observed. See, e.g., Gilliam, supra note 105, who suggests that subsequent Su-
preme Court cases have seriously eroded the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 51
n.35. Examples of such cases, suggests Gilliam, are Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (President Truman held without power to seize steel mills
during Korean conflict; Secretary of Commerce enjoined from enforcing Executive Or-
der to that effect); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Congress' exclusion
of Powell held improper; although Court barred from issuing direct order to members
of Congress, Speech and Debate Clause does not prevent action by Court against legis-
lative employees charged with unconstitutional activity). These two cases, along with
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169
(1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1880), seem to suggest, in their cumulative effect, that whenever the Supreme
Court desires a particular response from a coequal branch of government, a proper party
can be found against whom the Court can act to achieve its purpose. Indeed in Powell
v. McCormack, supra, the Court left open the frightening prospect of action directly
against members of Congress: "we need not decide whether under the Speech and De-
bate Clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain this action solely against members
of Congress where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other remedy
was available." Id. at 506 n.26. The Court, it should be noted, still has stopped short
of ever ordering a coequal branch or its agents to perform a positive, affirmative act.
Both Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, and Powell v. McCormack, supra,
involved essentially negative directives. See Dixon, supra note 149.
184. As the Supreme Court held in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946),
"[tihe Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme
to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the
vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights." Id. at 556.
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for the convention were invalid in some respect, or that the convention
had acted wrongfully or was about to usurp powers not granted to it
by the Constitution.
State courts that have considered this problem in the state consti-
tutional convention context have concluded that there exists no pro-
vision for court supervision of constitutional conventions, and that the
state courts will not anticipate the action of a proposed convention or
control it when assembled.18 5  That the convention has full control of
its proceedings has also been held, 88 but these decisions have not had
the effect of precluding subsequent judicial review by state courts of
the validity of the convention's work product.'8 7  In the federal
scheme, Professor Orfield views an article V national convention as es-
sentially a fourth branch of government, co-equal with the judiciary and
thus entitled to the same respect and autonomy as the executive and
legislative branches.' 8   Orfield suggests that just as injunctive relief
against another branch of government is beyond the power of the
courts, these same limitations would apply to a national convention.189
Although the Supreme Court would most likely not compel a co-
equal branch of government either to do or to stop doing a thing, the
federal courts could nevertheless rule upon constitutional issues pre-
sented by article V, yet refrain from upsetting the separation of powers
equilibrium by exercising their power to "declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought."10 In cases in which the
courts felt that an issue raised by article V was properly justiciable, they
could hand down declaratory judgments. The courts would presum-
ably rely upon the good faith of the parties to give such judgments their
full effect. If Congress' only justification for refusing to call a conven-
tion were that the constitutional requirements of article V had not been
met, a declaration by the Supreme Court that the requirements had
in fact been satisfied would undermine the excuse.' 91 Pressure upon
Congress to call the convention in light of such a decision would be
185. Wheeler, supra note 91, at 800.
186. Id. at 800-01.
187. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 672-73.
188. L. OR PELD, supra note 8, at 47-48.
189. Id.
190. Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). See also FED. R.
Civ. P. 57. For a general review of declaratory judgments in the federal scheme see
C. Wm1GHT, supra note 130, § 100.
191. Note, 85 HARv. L. Rnv., supra note 80, at 1644.
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well-nigh irresistible. In Powell v. McCormack,192 the Supreme Court
ruled that despite article I, section 5 of the Constitution,'93 Representa-
tive Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., of New York was entitled to a declara-
tory judgment that he had been unlawfully excluded from the House
of Representatives for the Ninetieth Congress. The Court said that
a "court may grant declaratory relief even though it chooses not to issue
an injunction or mandamus."' 94  Thus, although the courts may lack
power to compel Congress to act, this lack of authority should not deter
the use of declaratory relief to decide justiciable article V issues.
The Ervin Bill'U 9 attempts -to bar -all judicial review of its pro-
visions by insisting that constitutional issues "shall be determinable by
the Congress of the United States and its decisions thereon shall be
binding on all others, including State and Federal Courts."'196 How-
ever, there is serious question of the effectiveness and constitutionality
of this approach. The Congress has considerable power over the juris-
diction of lower federal courts, the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, and the jurisdiction of state courts when federal questions
are involved.' 97 However, Congress has no power to expand or limit
192. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
193. This section assigns to each house of Congress the exclusive power to judge
the elections and qualifications of its members, and to punish them for disorderly con-
duct. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
194. 395 U.S. at 499. Some pages later the Court elaborated upon the appropriate-
ness of declaratory relief under the circumstances:
Respondents do maintain, however, that this case is not justiciable because,
they assert, it is impossible for a federal court to "mold effective relief for re-
solving ths case." . . . We need express no opinion about the appropriateness
of coercive relief in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory judgment,
a form of relief the District Court could have issued .... The availability
of declaratory relief depends upon whether there is a live dispute between the
parties,. . . and a request for declaratory relief may be considered independ-
ently of whether other forms of relief are appropriate.
Id. at 517-18.
195. S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
196. Id. §§ 3(b), 5(c), 10(b), 13(c).
197. [H]aving a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of
its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated conti oversies. Courts created
by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.
mhe statute which does prescribe the limits of their jurisdiction, can-
not be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not enumer-
ated therein.
Such has been the doctrine held by this court since its first establishment.
To enumerate all the cases in which it has either been directly advanced or
tacitly assumed would be tedious and unnecessary.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). Likewise, in Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922), the Court noted that "Only the jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by
the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress."
See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 130, § 10; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
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the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.10 8 Thus if the Ervin
Bill should be enacted, it would clearly be ineffective to bar an original
suit in the Supreme Court in which a State were a party.'99 For ex-
ample, should a State, whose application for a convention was rejected
as inadequate under the Ervin Bill object to the provisions of that bill
as unconstitutional, presumably that State could bring suit in the Su-
preme Court to have its application declared valid under article V.
Since there would be both a federal question and a State as a party
involved, such a suit would fall squarely within the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.200 Further, since the Court cannot be made
to apply a rule of law which it finds unconstitutional,01 congressional
attempts to exclude judicial review or limit the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court would be ineffective. This fact is of critical im-
portance, for at various stages in the alternative amendment process,
it is probable that the States which have petitioned Congress for a con-
vention will be the parties most likely to challenge any act or lack of
action by Congress which such States feel interferes with their preroga-
tives under article V.
The question of justiciability of the amendment process generally
and of the alternative amendment procedure specifically remains un-
settled. Likewise the power of Congress to limit judicial review of is-
sues arising under article V is restricted, and in an important class of
cases, that power is ineffective. The scope of the judicial power over
the amendment process is today so poorly defined that no one, for any
purpose, should presume that the federal courts will not play an im-
portant role in the future development of article V.
IV. NoSTRUM
In retrospect, perhaps the most striking feature of the above dis-
cussion is the sharp disagreement among legal scholars regarding the
distribution and scope of the amendment power, particularly with
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: an Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362
(1953).
198. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Wright also points
out that the Supreme Court has always understood that the constitutional grant of origi-
nal jurisdiction is self-executing, and thus Congress cannot take it away. C. WRaIGH,
supra note 130, § 10.
199. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
200. For a general review of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court see C.
WRiGHT, supra note 130, §§ 109-10.
201. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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respect to the convention procedure. Indeed, on the subject of consti-
tutional conventions, the Constitution is either textually ambiguous or
provocatively mum. In truth, then, no one really knows how to amend
the Constitution by convention, and among -those who claim to know,
there are general differences of opinion on even -the most fundamental
propositions. Accordingly, the debate and discussion concerning
article V has resolved nothing, but has instead merely isolated the
major points of controversy.
In a word, the alternative amendment procedure is "imperfect";
and as such it is repugnant to the first of the three essential prereq-
uisites for amendment discussed earlier.20 2  Our present "imperfect"
understanding of the convention procedure could forever cloud the
legitimacy of any amendment proposed and ratified under this process.
The underlying political environment, if cankered by extreme partisan-
ship on some issue of basic concern, could poison the amendment proc-
ess; and should any sizable portion of the people become convinced
that a constitutional amendment was wrongfully adopted or rejected,
respect for the authority of the Constitution generally would be under-
mined.
Clearly some sort of action is required which will clarify the con-
vention procedure and remove the element of risk which has so long
forestalled full participation by the States in the amendment process.
Now is a most propitious time to formulate policies for change, for
there is at present no major nationwide effort by the States to have
a convention called. 03 This situation permits the convention process
to be examined on its own merits, and not merely as the means to a
particular end. The lack of any serious ongoing movement -to call a
convention enables reform of article V to proceed without suspicion of
the true motives of the reformers.
Recent efforts to reform the alternative aniendment procedure
have focused upon Congress. The Ervin Bill204 reflects the confidence
of many that Congress can solve most of the troublesome problems
legislatively. A recent report of the American Bar Association,
2-5
202. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
203. The busing controversy could, however, provoke such an effort in the near fu-
ture. See note 64 supra.
204. S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), discussed in notes 61-63, 96 and accom-
panying text supra.
205. SPECIAL CONSrrrToNAL CoNvENTiON STUDY CommrTrEE, Avm.cAN BAR As-
SOCIATION, AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION MLBTHOD UNDER
ARTICLE V (1974).
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while suggesting that certain portions of the Ervin Bill warrant sub-
stantial revision,206 concludes nevertheless that legislation by Congress
is the proper vehicle for article V reform.2 °7 However, the power of
Congress is too often overstated, and the general confidence in this
power is misplaced. Acts of Congress will prove ultimately inadequate
for at least two reasons.
First, the present Congress has no power through legislation to
bind and limit the discretion of future Congresses. While legislation
presently enacted may prove entirely satisfactory for the time being,
such legislation would remain subject to revision or repeal at any time.
Legislation today cannot eliminate the possibility that some future Con-
gress, confronted with a strong movement to have a convention called,
might suddenly enact new legislation, in effect changing the rules to
make the convention more difficult to obtain.
Secondly, it begs the question to assert that Congress can resolve
article V problems when the power of Congress to interfere in the con-
vention process is itself a focal point of controversy. Any attempt by
Congress to regulate the alternative amendment procedure inevitably
will raise the question of -the power of Congress to do so, serving only
to further complicate the issue.
Greater direction and guidance from the Constitution itself is most
obviously lacking, and is consequently most desperately required.
Since -the alternative amendment procedure in article V is imperfect,
attention should focus directly upon article V and not upon Congress.
In short, the Constitution should be amended to "perfect" article V. 08
Only when the resolution of problems in the convention procedure car-
ries with it the full force and authority of the Constitution will amend-
ment by convention become the genuine alternative to Congress it was
intended to be.20 9
206. In particular, the ABA report would amend the Ervin Bill to provide clearly
for federal court jurisdiction of controversies arising under article V withaut regard to
the amount in controversy. Id. at 57.
207. Id. at 7-9.
208. The idea of amending article V relative to the convention procedure is cer-
tainly not a new one. See, e.g., note 53 and accompanying text supra. Past attempts
to amend article V, however, have always arisen in the context of some other, more im-
mediate political issue. Amending article V has most often been suggested as a secon-
dary device to achieve a primary political purpose. The time has now come for article
V to be considered on its own merits.
209. This point, as does this entire comment, presumes that the alternative amend-
ment procedure should be preserved. This commentator rejects arguments suggesting
that the convention procedure is a mere historical relic and should be scrapped entirely,
leaving the congressional mode as the sole means of proposing constitutional amend.
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Congress should propose and the States should ratify a. constitu-
tional amendment expanding and clarifying article V. The following
language illustrates what such an amendment might attempt to do.210
ARTICLE V.
SECTION I. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution.
SECTION 2. Upon the application of the Legislatures of two-
thirds of the several States within any.__.__-year period,
Congress shall call a Convention which shall have the power
to propose Amendments to this Constitution; provided that
Congress shall not have power to call a Convention except
upon such application, and
a. such Applications shall
i. reasonably reflect a common desire for
amendment upon a particular subject, or
ii. shall reflect a common desire to amend in a
general manner the provisions of this Consti-
tution; and provided further that
b. in issuing the call for a Convention, Congress shall
i. provide for the total number of delegates, the
manner of their selection, and the ap-
portionment of their number among the sev-
eral States, and
ii. specify the date, time and place of the first
meeting of the Convention, and
iii. fix the compensation of the delegates and
provide for the expenses of the Convention,
to be paid from the Treasury.
A convention called under this Article shall not Temain in ses-
sion beyond the expiration of the Congress which originally called
it into session, except whenever two-thirds of both Houses of that
Congress shall deem it necessary, and then only for a term not to
exceed that of the next-elected Congress.
When, under rules and procedures agreed to by the delegates,
the Convention shall have concluded its business, it shall present to
the Congress all proposed Amendments agreed to; the Congress
shall then submit these proposed Amendments to the States for
ratification subject to SECTION 3 of this Article: provided that the
ments. Cf. note 49 supra. The remainder of the comment is intended to suggest means
whereby the convention procedure can be preserved and revitalized.
210. The complete language of present article V appears in text accompanying notes
3-4 supra.
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Congress shall not be obliged to submit for ratification any pro-
posed amendment which two-thirds of both Houses agree does not
reasonably relate to the particular subject manifested in the ap-
plications for a Convention under SECTION 2, Clause I(a)(i) of
this Article.
SECTION 3. Amendments proposed under this Article shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Con-
stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress: Provided that no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.
SECTION 4. Acts of Congress under this Article are not subject to
disapproval by the President under the provisions of Article
I, SECTION 7 of this Constitution.
Sections 1 and 3 are intended to preserve the present congres-
sional mode of proposing amendments. Note that the ratification proc-
ess in section 3 would apply equally to both the congressional and con-
vention procedure. Language in original article V pertaining to the
end of the slave trade in 1808 is obsolete and has been eliminated.
Section 2 provides a revised procedure for proposing amendments
by constitutional convention and attempts to resolve many of the prob-
lems inherent in original article V. Section 2, clause I insures the
existence of a national consensus for amendment by requiring that state
applications be submitted within a specified number of years in order
to be counted toward fulfilling the two-thirds requirement. The pre-
cise number of years is left blank and would be subject to thorough
consideration by Congress and the States. Clause I, by its use of the
plural form "Amendments," is intended to make clear the power of
the convention to propose more than one amendment, providing all
other conditions are satisfied.
The two provisos to section 2, clause I set out the requirements
for a valid application and delineate the powers of Congress over the
initial proceedings. In addition, the first clause of the first proviso
makes it impossible for Congress to call a convention unless the States
apply for one. Congress would not, under this provision, have power
to call a convention on its own initiative. A national consensus for
amendment, expressed in applications from two-thirds of the States, is
thus made a prerequisite to the calling of a convention.
Section 2, clause I, subsection a(i) contemplates an appropriate
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national consensus by providing that applications which do not pertain
to the same general subject will not be counted toward the two-thirds
requirement. Congress, as the body which has responsibility for call-
ing the convention, would make the initial determination of whether
a sufficient number of "reasonably-related" applications had been sub-
mitted. Any dispute under a(i) whether an application should be
counted could be resolved in the courts, and the weight given to Con-
gress' determination that a particular application did not bear sufficient
relationship to others would also be for the courts to decide."' Sub-
section a(ii) is cast in disjunctive terms from a(i) and preserves the
right of the States to petition for a convention with power -to propose
general, far-ranging revisions of our constitutional system. Such pro-
posals would, however, be subject to ratification under section 3.
Phrasing a(i) and a(ii) in the alternative makes it clear that a general
convention may be called only when specifically requested and that ap-
plications within the time limit from two-thirds of the States on a variety
of different subjects do not warrant or require Congress' calling a gen-
eral convention.
Section 2, clause I, subsection b(i) gives Congress the power and
obligation to determine the number, manner of selection and appor-
tionment of delegates to the convention. The question of whether
members of Congress may simultaneously serve as delegates is im-
plicitly left subject to the rulemaking authority of the convention re-
ferred to in clause 1H1. Subsection b(ii) permits Congress to fulfill its
duty to call the convention by providing for the date, time and place
of the first meeting of the convention. Once convened, the convention
would then be free to determine its own schedule and meeting place.
Subsection b(iii) imposes a duty upon Congress to appropriate funds
for the expenses of the convention, so that Congress could not by in-
211. This commentator believes that such issues as this, presented in the context of
an article V amended as herein suggested, would clearly be within the judicial power
of the federal courts under article III. Accordingly, language to this effect in article
V is not required. In order to insure the availability of a judicial forum for the ultimate
resolution of article V disputes, Congress could enact a special statute extending jurisdic-
tion over such matters to the federal courts, presumably with no inrisdictional amount
requirement. Cf. SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMMITrEE, AMERICAN
BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 205, § 16(a), at 57. Since time is a key factor in as-
sembling the required number of petitions under this amended article V, some provision
for expedited appeals should be included if jurisdiction arises originally in the federal
district courts. In cases where a State is a party to the action, serious consideration
should be given to expressly including such cases within the original and exclusive juris-
diction of the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970), since such a case would
present issues of paramount constitutional significance.
1975]
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direction defeat the purpose of the convention by depriving it of
financial support.
Section 2, clause I is designed to allay fears of those who are
anxious that the convention would transform itself into a permanent
and perpetual "fourth branch of the government." Under this clause,
the maximum length of a convention would be just under four years,
presuming the original convention to be called immediately after the
swearing-in of a newly-elected Congress. The convention could be ex-
tended beyond the two-year term of that Congress only by consent of
Congress, and then for only one additional two-year term. Since two-
thirds of both houses is required to submit for ratification an amend-
ment proposed by Congress, this same supermajority should be re-
quired to extend a convention. Note that "extension" of a convention
already in session differs from "calling" a convention originally. Under
section 2, clause I, Congress is not permitted to call a convention unless
it has a sufficient number of valid applications. Section 2, clause II,
however, would permit Congress in its discretion to extend a conven-
tion which it had originally called, and such extension would not re-
quire further applications. Only one extension is permitted, since
there is no assurance that the national consensus would continue for
a longer period of time. If such a consensus were to persist, it could
again be manifested by applications for a new convention.
Section 2, clause III provides the machinery with which the con-
vention actually proposes amendments. Under the "rules and pro-
cedures" authority recognized by this clause, the delegates would adopt
their own rules of procedure and would have power to determine the
size of the majority needed to propose a particular amendment. The
clause requires presentation of all proposed amendments to Congress,
which in turn has -the responsibility of submitting them to the States
for ratification under section 3. The proviso to clause IHt strikes an
essential balance between the powers of Congress and those of the con-
vention. If two-thirds of both houses of Congress agree that any or
all of the proposed amendments do not pertain to the particular sub-
ject matter stated in the applications [section 2, clause Ia(i)], then
Congress may refuse to submit such amendments for ratification.
Again, this congressional determination should be reviewable in the
federal courts.21 All amendments proposed by a general convention
212. See note 211 supra.
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called under section 2, clause Ia(ii) should be submitted for ratification
since the proviso in clause III does not apply in this situation.
Section 4 would write into the Constitution the sound wisdom of
the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Virginia213 to the effect that
the President's veto does not apply to acts of Congress involving consti-
tutional amendments. This section would apply to acts of Congress
pursuant to either mode of amendment.
Recent events have focused popular attention upon our Constitu-
tion and the fundamental principles of our form of government to a
degree unmatched perhaps since the great ratification debates of the
eighteenth century. In return, our constitutional system has proved its
worth, its strength and ability to withstand extreme challenge and
emerge the better for it. Accordingly, the present affords an ideal
time to consider -the problems inherent in -the procedure whereby our
Constitution may be changed as contemporary wisdom dictates. In so
doing, the role of the States in the constitutional amendment process
can be reaffirmed. This can best be achieved by amending -the words
of the Founding Fathers to reflect more accurately their original expect-
ations. Until this is done, there remains with us the spectre of a fresh
constitutional crisis, one involving not merely the petty motives and
ambitions of individual persons, but -the very right of States to deter-
mine to some extent the essential terms of their federalism.
MCHAEL A. ALMOND
213. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), discussed in note 143 supra.
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